I looked up the SCOTUS decision on Citizens United. Admittedly, I only did a cursory scan of some of the materials here. I was interested in the remarks about corruption. It is complicated, but in this opinion by Justice Kennedy, I found the following quote. It may very well be out of context. Check for yourself.<\/p>\n
Justice Kennedy , Opinion of the Court<\/a><\/p>\n \n What we have said also shows the invalidity of other arguments made by the Government. For the most part relinquishing the antidistortion rationale, the Government falls back on the argument that corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. In Buckley , the Court found this interest \u201csufficiently important\u201d to allow limits on contributions but did not extend that reasoning to expenditure limits. 424 U. S., at 25. When Buckley examined an expenditure ban, it found \u201cthat the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] on independent expenditures.\u201d Id. , at 45.<\/p>\n With regard to large direct contributions, Buckley reasoned that they could be given \u201cto secure a political quid pro quo ,\u201d id. , at 26, and that \u201cthe scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained,\u201d id. , at 27. The practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. \u00a7201, if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved. See Buckley, supra, at 27, and n. 28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo , 519 F. 2d 821, 839\u2013840, and nn. 36\u201338 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) ). The Court, in consequence, has noted that restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements. MCFL , 479 U. S., at 260; NCPAC , 470 U. S., at 500; Federal Election Comm\u2019n v. National Right to Work Comm. , 459 U. S. 197, 210 (1982) (NRWC) . The Buckley Court, nevertheless, sustained limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption. That case did not extend this rationale to independent expenditures, and the Court does not do so here. <\/p>\n For the reasons explained above, we now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.<\/strong>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n