This post is kind of like a shaggy dog story in that there are a lot of words before I get to the punchline. I assure you that there is a punchline. I don’t know how else I can make the case.
Perhaps China has not forgotten the Asian debt crisis that was forming around 1997.
Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, describes the roots of the crisis. [Page 336]
Back in the early nineties, whenever advocates of free trade wanted a persuasive success story to invoke in debates, they invariably pointed to the Asian Tigers. These were the miracle economies that were growing by leaps and bounds, supposedly because they had flung open their borders to unrestricted globalization. It was a useful story – the Tigers were certainly developing with whirlwind speed – but to suggest that their expansion was based on free trade was a fiction. Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand still had highly protectionist policies that barred foreigners from owning land and from buying out national firms. They had also maintained a significant role for the state, keeping sectors like energy and transportation in public hands. The Tigers had also blocked many foreign imports from Japan, Europe, and North America, as they built up their own domestic markets. They were economic success stories unquestionably, but ones that proved mixed, managed economies grew faster and more equitably than those following the Wild West Washington Consensus.
The situation did not please Western and Japanese investment banks and multinational firms; watching Asia’s consumer market explode, they understandably longed for unfettered access to the region to sell their products. They also wanted the right to buy up the best of the Tigers’ corporations – particularly Korea’s impressive conglomerates like Daewoo, Hyundai, Samsung, and LG. In the mid-nineties, under pressure from the IMF and the newly created World Trade Organization, Asian countries agreed to split the difference: they would maintain laws that protected national firms from foreign ownership and resist pressure to privatize their key state companies, but they would lift barriers to their financial sectors, allowing a surge of paper investing and currency trading.
In 1997, when the flood of hot money suddenly reversed current in Asia, it was a direct result of this kind of speculative investment, which was legalized only because of Western pressure. Wall Street, or course, didn’t see it that way. Top investment analysts instantly recognized the crisis as a chance to level the remaining barriers protecting Asia’s markets once and for all. Pelosky, the Morgan Stanley strategist, was particularly forthright about the logic: if the crisis was left to worsen, all foreign currency would be drained from the region and Asian-owned companies would have either to close down or to sell themselves to Western firms – both beneficial outcomes for Morgan Stanley….
I’ll leave out many of the details, but try to cut to the chase.
Fischer had been one of the most vocal advocates of shock therapy in Russia, and despite harrowing human costs there, his attitude was just as unyielding in Asia. Several governments suggested that since the crisis was caused by the ease with which money could gush in and out of their countries with nothing to slow down the flow, perhaps it made sense to put some barriers back up – the dreaded “capital controls.” China had kept its controls up (ignoring Friedman’s advice in this regard), and it was the only country in the region that was not being ravaged by the crisis. And Malaysia had put controls back up, and they seemed to be working.
The reddening and bolding of the sentence above is not in the original text. Since I promised a punchline, I wanted to make sure you didn’t miss it.
Now that you have read a little bit of the history, can you understand why China doesn’t just jump on the advice from the West on how to run their economy? If you were in their shoes, would you sacrifice the well being of your country to satisfy the whims of another who clearly doesn’t know beans about how to run a mixed economy?
And George Bush wondered why some countries and people hate us?
November 15, 2010
Potential corroboration is in the article China seeks to learn from mistakes of 1985 Plaza Accord. This article was published in 2006.