The New Yorker has the article In Extremists’ Iraq Rise, America’s Legacy.

Today, many Iraqis, including some close to Maliki, say that a small force of American soldiers—working in non-combat roles—would have provided a crucial stabilizing factor that is now missing from Iraq. Sami al-Askari, a Maliki confidant, told me for my article this spring, “If you had a few hundred here, not even a few thousand, they would be coöperating with you, and they would become your partners.” President Obama wanted the Americans to come home, and Maliki didn’t particularly want them to stay.

I wonder how this would have worked.  Would a few hundred privates do it?  Maybe sergeants? Or how about colonels?  I  know, a few hundred generals. Is a Maliki confidant a good source to explain how a few hundred American soldiers in non-combat roles would have been enough to prevent Maliki from giving into his worst instincts? Is this healthy skepticism on my part, or am I just unwilling to put the blame on President Obama?

If an existential threat to Maliki and the Shia led Iraqi government isn’t enough to change Maliki’s behavior, would a few hundred soldiers have been able to do it?

Thanks to Nadeem Kalil for posting this on his facebook wall.