Naked Capitalism has the interesting article The Fatal Flaw in Macroprudential Policy: It Ignores Political Risk.

In contrast, the macropru policymaker is faced with a complex, ill-defined policy domain in which there is not a clear consensus on either the problem or the objective. The indicators at this policymaker’s disposal are often imprecise and conflicting. The surgical implementation tools are often ineffective, and the powerful implementation tools are too blunt. Macropru also tends to result in clearly identifiable winners and losers, perhaps even more so than monetary policy. As a result, it is subject to intensive lobbying and political pressure.

This adversely affects both the legitimacy of the macropru regulator, and the regulator’s reputation for impartiality.

I have a hard time figuring out who or what is a macropru regulator in the system that prevails in the USA. In my imagination, such a “regulator” would decide on budget deficits and fiscal policy in a wider sense. There is no such purely technocratic entity in our system of governance. Every time I try to imagine what one would look like, I come up against political (and practical) roadblocks to creating one.

So we are left to speculate on how great things would be if there were a technocratic solution divorced from politics. As far as I know there is no democratically run government of any significance that has figured out how to do this.